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The mobile phone is like a cow. It gives me “milk” several times a
day. And all I need to do is to keep its battery charged. It does
not need to be fed, cleaned, and milked. It has now connected
our village with the world.
Parveen Begum, owner and sole dispenser of mobile telephony
services in Village Chakalgram, Savar Thana, Bangladesh,
in a personal interview (May 2, 2001)
I want my fellow Americans to know that the people of
Bangladesh are a good investment. With loans to buy cell
phones, entire villages are brought into the information age. I
want people throughout the world to know this story
U.S. President Bill Clinton in an address during his meeting
with members of the Village Phone Project in Dhaka, Bangladesh
in March, 2000
As a great social leveler, information technology ranks second
only to death. It can raze cultural barriers, overwhelm economic
inequalities, even compensate for intellectual disparities. In short,
high technology can put unequal human beings on an equal
footing, and that makes it the most potent democratizing tool
ever devised. 
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A third of the world’s population has never made a phone call. This fact
emphasizes what has become known as the digital divide –the tremendous gap
between people with access to information technology (IT) and those without
(Martínez-Frías, 2003). The present chapter discusses the experience of the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in harnessing information technologies for social
change. We especially focus on the Grameen’s mobile telephony operations,
including how the organization integrates mobile telephony services with solar
power and Internet services to overcome the digital divide. 
Grameen Bank, mobile telephony, and social dividends
How can information technologies be harnessed in rural areas, where there is no
dedicated electrical power, and where the cost of installing, maintaining, and
purchasing such services is cumbersome? One answer to this problem is provided
by the Grameen (rural) Bank in Bangladesh. Founded in 1983 by Professor
Muhammad Yunus, the Grameen Bank is a system of lending small amounts of
money to poor women so that they can earn a living through self-employment.
No collateral is needed, as the poor do not have any. Instead, the women borrow-
ers are organized in a group of five friends. Each group member must repay their
loan on time, while ensuring that other group members do the same, or else their
opportunity for a future loan is jeopardized. This delicate dynamic between
“peer-pressure” and “peer-support” among Grameen borrowers is at the heart
of its widespread success (Auwal and Singhal, 1992; Papa, Auwal and Singhal,
1995; Papa, Auwal and Singhal, 1997; Yunus, 1999). 
By 2004, the Grameen Bank had loaned the equivalent of $ 4.3 bil-
lion (US dollars) to 3.5 million poor borrowers (of which 95% are women bor-
rowers), and had an enviable loan recovery rate of 98%. The idea of micro-
lending, based on the Grameen Bank experience, has spread throughout the
world, and has everywhere proven effective in gaining a high rate of repayment
of the loans. In short, interpersonal networks are effective collateral for poor
women.
In 1997, Professor Yunus established a non-profit organization called
Grameen Telecom with the vision of placing one mobile phone in each of the
68,000 villages of Bangladesh. At that time, there was one telephone in
Bangladesh for every 400 people, representing one of the lowest telephone den-
sities in the world1. There was virtually no access to telephony services in rural
areas. Professor Yunus realized that while it was not possible for each rural house-
hold to own a telephone, it is possible through mobile telephone technology to
provide access to each villager. 
Thus the Grameen Telecom’s Village Phone Project (VPP) was born. In
1997, Grameen Telecom formed a joint venture company called GrameenPhone
Ltd. (GP) in partnership with Telenor of Norway, Marubeni of Japan, and
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1 In 2004, there exists one telephone in Bangladesh for every 175 people.
Gonofone Development Corporation of the US2. The company, GP, was awarded
license to operate nation-wide GSM-900 cellular network on 11 November,
1996. GP started its operation on March 26, 1997.
Creating win-win synergies
The business model of the VPP was deceptively simple and a potential win-win for
everyone involved, including the service providers and the end users (Singhal,
Svenkerud and Flydal, 2002). Four business entities were involved in the VPP:
GrameenPhone (the for-profit business), Grameen Telecom (the not-for-profit
business), Grameen Bank (the not-for-profit micro-credit bank), and the mobile
handset owner in the village, commonly referred to as the Village Phone Lady
(who was a member of Grameen Bank) (Malaviya, Singhal, Svenkerud and
Srivastava, 2004a, 2004b). 
GrameenPhone sold bulk airtime to Grameen Telecom at half the reg-
ular rate that was levied in the urban areas. The handsets were made available to
villagers through Grameen Bank loans. Grameen Telecom was responsible for the
sales, marketing, servicing and administration of the village phones. This arrange-
ment meant that GrameenPhone avoided the costs of billing and bill collection
from the village phone users, and had a steady revenue stream from Grameen
Telecom. Grameen Bank benefited by cross-selling to villagers (who were existing
Grameen Bank borrowers) the opportunity to start an additional business of pro-
viding mobile phone services in their village. Because the initial loan for a mobile
phone set was about USD 390, an amount few villagers could invest on their
own, these Grameen Bank members took loans to lease or purchase the mobile
telephone sets, thus generating additional income for Grameen Bank (Malaviya,
Singhal, Svenkerud and Srivastava, 2004b). In addition, villagers settled their
monthly telephone bills while repaying their loan amounts. For Grameen
Telecom, the VPP set-up meant that it could be optimistic about fulfilling its
promise of providing mobile telephony in villages for the rural poor of
Bangladesh. While most telephone companies targeted only the rich living in the
cities, Grameen Telecom’s VPP targeted the rural poor, particularly women,
because 95% of Grameen Bank borrowers are women. The Village Phone Ladies
benefited because they now had an independent source of revenue. The villagers
who used the mobile phones to make and receive calls benefited because they
were now “connected” to the rest of the world, using one of the most modern
cellular technologies of the world, while paying one of the cheapest cellular rates
in the world. And from the perspective of the Government of Bangladesh, with
the ‘mobile’ presence of the village telephone lady, rural residents could receive
and make telephone calls, obviating the need to install expensive large-scale tele-
phone exchanges and digital switching systems.
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2 Telenor Corporation is the majority owner of Grameen Phone’s equity (over 50%); Grameen Telecom
owns about 35% of the equity, and the other partners own the balance. 
Rising profits
Since its inception in 1997, Grameen Phone’s subscription has doubled each year
to reach over a million subscribers by December 2003 (Malaviya, Singhal,
Svenkerud and Srivastava, 2004b), which represents the biggest subscriber base
and coverage of any mobile telephony operator in Bangladesh, and in South Asia.
The company turned a profit in 2000 of $14 million, which steeply climbed to
over $110 million in 2002 (Malaviya, Singhal, Svenkerud and Srivastava, 2004b).
Many believe that even brighter business prospects lie ahead: demand for mobile
telephony services in Bangladesh is estimated at about 5 to 6 million subscribers
(out of a population of 130 million people). Grameen Phone’s growing mobile
telephony network in the country and its financial viability help the Grameen
Telecom’s Village Phone Project to piggyback on it. 
Social dividends
By April 2004, some 54,000 village phones were operating (about 5% of all
GrameenPhone’s subscribers) in about 36,000 Bangladeshi villages. These 54,000
village phones were serving an estimated 65 million rural inhabitants, more than
60% of Bangladesh’s rural population. The village phones, on average, generated
2-3 times more revenues for GrameenPhone than a personal use city subscrip-
tion, although the total revenue from these village phones was a relatively small
percent of total GrameenPhone revenues (6%)
(<www.telecommons.com/villagephone>, 2000).
Although the village phones contributed a small percent toward
GrameenPhone revenues, they yielded a very high social impact in terms of reach-
ing 65 million rural Bangladeshis who previously did not have access to telephony
services. Studies indicated that the VPP had a very positive economic impact in
rural areas, creating a substantial consumer surplus, and immeasurable quality-of-
life enhancements3. For instance, the village phone obviated the need for a rural
farmer to make a trip to the city to find out the market price of produce. The vil-
lage phone accomplished this task at about one-fourth the cost of taking the trip
to the city and almost instantaneously (as compared to the hours of time it can
take to make the trip to Dhaka). Further, the village phone helped families keep in
touch with relatives overseas, to know about remittances sent to them from
migrant workers overseas, and patients to arrange appointments with the doc-
tors in the cities. Also, people living in the villages were thinking and doing things
somewhat differently after the mobile phone arrived. For instance, many villagers
started maintaining livestock and poultry stocks as it now became possible to
contact experts if there was ever an outbreak of a poultry or livestock disease
(Malaviya, Singhal, Svenkerud and Srivastava, 2004b). They could also learn of
the current market prices of their poultry products achieving higher returns on
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3 See Richardson et al (2000) and Bayes et al (1999).
sales. The supply of agricultural inputs like diesel and fertilizer become more sta-
ble in the villages because dealers could monitor the supply situation throughout
the year and guard against any unforeseen contingencies. 
Rural women in Bangladesh also became increasingly empowered
through the Village Phone Project. Usually, technological “toys” (such as cameras,
radios, cassette players and others) are appropriated by rural men. However,
through the VPP the mobile phone was placed in the hands of rural women. Now
even a rich landowner had to come to their home to access the telephone service.
He had to wait in line for his turn if another villager was using the phone at that
time. The home of the village phone lady became an important location on the vil-
lage map, often being referred to as the Phone Bari (or “home of the phone”). The
VPP thus conferred status and prestige on rural Bangladeshi women. 
So what have been the overall effects of the Village Phone Project in
rural Bangladesh? The Village Phone Project makes telephony services accessible
and affordable to poor, rural Bangladeshis, spurs employment, increases the
social status of the village telephone ladies, provides access to market information
and to medical services, and represents a tool to communicate with family and
friends within Bangladesh and outside (Richardson et al, 2000; Bayes et al, 1999;
Quadir, 2003). 
Integrating telephony with solar power and Internet services
Another information technology venture of the Grameen Bank is the Village
Internet Program (VIP), a pilot project in which borrowers obtain loans to pur-
chase and operate “cyber kiosks” for profit. The purpose behind the “cyber
kiosks” is for Grameen borrowers to have increased access to agricultural and
market information for business use, to provide distance and virtual education
through remote classroom facilities, and to provide computer-based employment
(such as data-entry, transcription services, etc.) in rural areas, as an alternative to
massive migration to the cities (Yunus, 1998). 
The VIP is supported by established infrastructures and technologies
within the Grameen family of companies. For instance, Grameen Shakti
(“Energy”) has developed photovoltaic solar systems to provide electricity to vil-
lages that lie beyond the national grid of central station electricity. The plan of VIP
is to have cyber kiosks that run on solar power and connect to the Internet by
mobile wireless, microwave, and laser connections. Each cyber kiosk will be run as
an independently-owned and operated franchise of Grameen Communications,
in which the borrower will earn money by selling Internet, telephony, and other
computer-related services (Yunus, 1998). 
Lessons learned
The key lessons of the Grameen Bank approach to the use of mobile telephony
and Internet services are the following.
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1. Poor people should not just be the passive consumers of communication tech-
nology, but rather its owners. When poor people own communication technolo-
gy in ways to provide increased access to information to the resource-poor and, in
so doing, create a viable business proposition for themselves, they help bridge the
digital and economic divide in society.
2. Low-income emerging markets for information technology products can be
profitable. Reaching out to rural customer segments in emerging markets should
not always be equated with charity and benevolence; rather it is possible to cre-
ate models of social entrepreneurship which subscribe to multiple, co-existing,
and mutually-reinforcing (win-win) bottom-lines (Prahalad, 2004; Quadir, 2003;
Singhal, Svenkerud and Flydal, 2002). In low-income markets, such as in
Bangladesh and other developing countries, companies must view the consumers
as actively engaged in seeking a good life, not as passive consumers who merely
want satisfaction (Letelier, 2003). The GrameenPhone was able to identify cultur-
ally relevant opportunities by making the link between culture and the purchase
motive of the consumers. 
Grameen’s venture (in cooperation with Telenor of Norway and others)
shows that multiple bottom-lines, such as the following, can be met.
» Commercial interests in terms of revenues, profits, and growth.
» Social cause-related interests in terms of serving unserved and under-
served markets nationally, and also serving poor, rural, illiterate inhab-
itants who are traditionally excluded from traditional markets –thus
overcoming the digital divide.
However, Telenor’s forays into Bangladesh were not free of problems, pointing to
the complexities in forging long-term win-win partnerships. The bureaucratic and
regulatory hurdles under the state-owned telecommunications monopoly
Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board (BTTB), as well as Bangladesh’s unsta-
ble political regime, is problematic for GrameenPhone’s business operations
(Malaviya, Singhal, Svenkerud and Srivastava, 2004b). For instance, the uncertain
political support and the fear of heavy taxation have forced Telenor to re-invest all
its profits into the Bangladeshi venture rather than attempt to take these profits
out of country as dividend for its shareholders (Telenor’s shareholders, under-
standably, were clamoring to receive dividends). 
3. Development organizations that have a good “brand” value and wide rural
reach in a developing country, are uniquely positioned to partner with corpora-
tions to extend the benefits of information technology in rural areas. Here
Grameen’s collaboration with Telenor Corporation of Norway is instructive.
Clearly, in Bangladesh, “Grameen” has tremendous brand equity by virtue of its
widespread success in poverty alleviation, empowerment of rural women, and its
well-known credo that “good development is good business” (which is also the
slogan of the Village Phone Project). Many in Bangladesh feel that the
“Grameen” brand is far more recognized in Bangladesh than even Coca Cola! So
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branding the new venture Grameen Phone brought instant credibility to Telenor’s
business venture in Bangladesh. Also, Telenor’s partnering with Grameen Telecom
made possible the Village Phone Project, whereby Grameen Bank borrowers who
take loans to lease or purchase the mobile telephone sets now settle their month-
ly telephone bills through the bank workers. The already existing village-based
loan disbursement and repayment infrastructure of the Grameen Bank allows for
handling the logistics of the Village Phone Project at a very small, additional mar-
ginal cost. 
That said, Grameen Bank’s involvement in the Village Phone Project is
perceived by some as problematic. Critics argue that the selection process of vil-
lage telephone ladies propagates inequity by disallowing the most disadvantaged
rural women to participate (Singhal and Rogers, 2001). At the present time, the
“selected” village phone lady should have (a) a solid record of borrowing and
repaying Grameen Bank loans, (b) a successful existing business, for example, a
village grocery store, (c) a residence that is centrally located on the village map,
and (d) a family member who knows English letters and numbers. Few village
women in Bangladesh fulfill these criteria. Further, such a ‘self-selection’ of village
telephone ladies propagates a monopolistic control of telephony services at the
village level.
Conclusions
Despite the aforementioned problems and constraints, the Grameen Bank’s inte-
grated initiatives in harnessing information technologies for development are
exemplary and laudatory. That is one reason why the GrameenPhone project
directly inspired, in 2003, the MTN villagePhone project in Uganda to bring
telephony to underserved areas. This project –representing a unique collaboration
between Grameen Foundation USA, MTN Uganda (the country’s largest telecom-
munications service provider), and five local microfinance institutions– was oper-
ational in 350 Ugandan villages by mid-2004, serving close to one million rural
inhabitants. By 2008, the MTN villagePhone project is estimated to place 5,000
village phones in rural Uganda, serving 10 million poor inhabitants who previous-
ly had no access to telephony.
In conclusion, the Grameen information technology operations in
Bangladesh, and its emerging replication in Uganda, demonstrate how “penny”
capitalism can operate creatively to bridge the digital divide and serve the under-
dogs of society.
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